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Governments in all parts of the world are withdrawing in 
practice from meeting the legal duty to provide refugees with 
the protection they require. While states continue to proclaim 
a willingness to assist refugees as a matter of political discre-
tion or humanitarian goodwill, many appear committed to a 
pattern of defensive strategies designed to avoid international 
legal responsibility toward involuntary migrants. Some see 
this shift away from a legal paradigm of refugee protection as a 
source of enhanced operational flexibility in the face of changed 
political circumstances. For refugees themselves, however, the 
increasingly marginal relevance of international refugee law has 
in practice signaled a shift to inferior or illusory protection. 
It has also imposed intolerable costs on many of the poorest 
countries, and has involved states in practices antithetical to 
their basic political values.
In the face of resistance of this kind, it be must recognized 
that no international oversight body (or international agency) 
will ever be positioned actually to require governments to 
implement rights perceived by states as at odds with their 
fundamental interests. The real challenge is therefore to design 
a structure for the implementation of Refugee Convention 
rights which states will embrace, or at least see as reconcilable 
to their own priorities. Only with the benefit of an implementa-
tion mechanism of this kind will governments be persuaded 
normally to abide by even clear Convention duties; and only 
when compliance is the norm will it be realistic to expect any 
supervisory mechanism to be capable of responding dependably 
and effectively to instances of non-compliance.
To be clear, it is suggested here that the goal should be to 
reconceive the mechanisms by which international refugee law, 
including the refugee rights regime, are implemented—not to 
undertake a renegotiation of the Refugee Convention itself. 
Those who favor the latter course seem largely to misun-
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derstand the nature and function of the Convention-based 
protection regime. The goal of refugee law, like that of public 
international law in general, is not to deprive states of either 
authority or operational flexibility. It is instead to enable 
governments to work more effectively to resolve problems 
of a transnational character, thereby positioning them better 
to manage complexity, contain conflict, promote decency, 
and avoid catastrophe. Indeed, international refugee law was 
established precisely because it was seen to afford states a politi-
cally and socially acceptable way to maximize border control 
in the face of socially inevitable involuntary migration—an 
objective which is, if anything, even more pressing today than 
it was in earlier times. Refugee law has fallen out of favor 
with many states not because there is any real belief either 
that governments can best respond to involuntary migration 
independently, or that the human dignity of refugees should be 
infringed in the interests of operational efficiency. Rather, there 
seems to be overriding sentiment that there is a lack of balance 
in the mechanisms of the refugee regime which results in little 
account being taken of the legitimate interests of the states to 
which refugees flee.
• First, some governments increasingly believe that a clear 
commitment to refugee protection may be tantamount to the 
abdication of their migration control responsibilities. They see 
refugee protection as little more than an uncontrolled “back 
door” immigration route which contradicts official efforts to 
tailor admissions on the basis of economic or other criteria, and 
which is increasingly at odds with critical national security and 
related priorities.
• Second, neither the actual duty to admit refugees nor the real 
costs associated with their arrival are fairly apportioned among 
states. There is a keen awareness that the countries in which 
refugees arrive—overwhelmingly poor, and often struggling 
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with their own economic or political survival—presently bear 
sole legal responsibility for what often amounts to indefinite 
protection.
In short, the legal duty to protect refugees is understood to 
be neither in the national interest of most states, nor a fairly 
apportioned collective responsibility. It is therefore resisted.
There are ways to address both of these concerns. As a 
starting point, there needs to be a clear recognition that 
refugee protection responsibilities can be implemented without 
denying states the right to set their own immigration priorities. 
The refugee regime is not an immigration system; it rather 
establishes a situation-specific human rights remedy. When 
the violence or other human rights abuse that induced refugee 
flights come to an end, so too does refugee status. Equally 
important, even this right to protection is explicitly denied to 
serious criminals who pose a danger to the host community, 
and to persons who threaten national security.
Nor is the duty of protection logically assigned on the 
basis of accidents of geography or the relative ability of states 
to control their borders. To the contrary, governments have 
regularly endorsed the importance of international solidarity 
and burden-sharing to an effective regime of refugee protec-
tion. While collectivized efforts to date have been ad hoc and 
usually insufficient, they provide an experiential basis for 
constructing an alternative to the present system of unilat-
eral and undifferentiated state obligations. It is particularly 
important to recognize that different states have differing 
capabilities to contribute to a collectivized process of refugee 
protection. Some states will be best suited to provide physical 
protection for the duration of risk. Other states will be 
motivated to assist by providing dependable guarantees of 
financial resources and residual resettlement opportunities. 
Still other governments will collaborate by funding protection 
or receiving refugees in particular contexts, on a case-by-case 
basis. Under a thoughtful system of common but differentiated 
responsibility, the net resources available for refugee protection 
could be maximized by calling on states to contribute in ways 
that correspond to their relative capacities and strengths.
In short, none of the legitimate concerns voiced by govern-
ments amounts to a good reason to question the underlying 
soundness of responding to involuntary migration in line with 
the rights-based commitments set by the Refugee Convention 
and other core norms of international law.
Today, more than ever before, governments are engaged in 
a variety of serious discussions regarding reform of the refugee 
law system. Perhaps spurred on by the formal commitment 
made on the 50th anniversary of the Refugee Convention in 
2001, there is clear interest in exploring both the operational 
flexibility which refugee law affords, and the value of systems 
to share both the responsibilities and burdens inherent in 
refugee protection. It is not at all clear, however, that these 
initiatives are predicated on the central importance of finding 
practical ways by which to respond to involuntary migration 
from within a rights-based framework. Poorer states are glad 
that there is, at last, some realization by governments in the 
developed world that ad hoc charity must be replaced by firm 
guarantees to share responsibilities and burdens. Governments 
of wealthier and more powerful countries are pleased that the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees  and other states are now 
prepared to acquiesce in demands that their refugee protection 
responsibilities not be construed to impose ongoing obligations 
towards all who arrive at their territory. But potentially lost 
in the discussions as they have evolved to date is the central 
importance of reforming the mechanisms of refugee law not 
simply to avert perceived hardships for states but also in ways 
that really improve the lot of refugees themselves. It is not 
enough to find sources of operational flexibility, nor even to 
devise mechanisms by which to share the responsibilities and 
burdens. If the net result of these reforms is only to lighten 
the load of governments, or to signal the renewed relevance of 
international agencies to meeting the priorities of states, then 
an extraordinary opportunity to advance the human dignity of 
refugees themselves will have been lost.
The real challenge is to ensure that the reform process is 
actually driven by a determination fully and dependably to 
implement the agreed human rights of refugees, even as it 
simultaneously advances the interests of governments. There 
is no necessary inconsistency between these goals; to the 
contrary, they are actually mutually reinforcing priorities. The 
Convention’s refugee rights regime establishes a framework that 
can easily lay the groundwork for solutions to the current crisis 
of confidence in the value of refugee law.
